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It is my pleasure to welcome you, Dr. Naimark.
SPEAKER
(Dr. Naimark has submitted a paper which is published below in its entirety.)
BIOTECHNOLOGY, INNOVATION AND HEALTH
Dr. Arnold Naimark*

INTRODUCTION
Innovation has been a hot topic in Canada in recent years. Pundits, policy
wonks, captains of industry, politicians and academics have come to espouse
a strong culture of innovation as Canada's best hope for long-term economic
growth. Although Canada's economy is doing relatively well just now, we
recognize that much of our current prosperity relies on export of commodities and that we still have a significant distance to go to reach the productivity levels of the United States.
Beginning in the 1990's the federal government and the wealthier provinces introduced targeted and well-funded initiatives to support the academic,
research and infrastructure requirements of an "innovation agenda" with a
strong emphasis on collaborative efforts through the development of innovation clusters and networks. A significant portion of this investment has been
directed to the life sciences generally and in particular to the applications of
biotechnology in health, agriculture, aquaculture, forestry, health and the
environment - with the lion's share going to human and animal health.
The area of biotechnology attracting most of the attention are the result of
revolutionary discoveries in molecular biology and genetics - discoveries
that have produced powerful new tools to promote health and to aid in the
prevention, diagnosis and treatment of disease and disability. Knowing the
* Dr. Arnold Naimark is currently Professor of Medicine and Physiology at the University
of Manitoba and Director of its Centre for the Advancement of Medicine. He is the Founding
Chairman of the Canadian Health Services Research Foundation and of the Canadian Biotechnology Advisory Committee, Chairman of the Science Advisory Board of Health Canada and
Chairman of Genome Prairie. Dr. Naimark serves on the Council of the Canadian Institute for
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genetic make-up of plants, animals and microbes helps us to create new vaccines, to identify disease susceptibility of individuals and populations, to
tailor the development and use of therapeutic drugs to the specific characteristics of individuals; and to use advanced methods of gene transfer and stem
cell transplantation to restore normal structure and function to diseased or
malfunctioning organs and tissues. When one adds to these developments,
the integration of biotechnology and nanotechnology to produce microscopic
diagnostic probes or precisely targeted molecular delivery systems for drugs,
it is easy to understand why many believe that biotechnology-based health
innovations will have profound effects on the practice of medicine and on
health care systems generally.
The promise of health-related biotechnology comes with significant challenges for policy makers and legislators as they seek to promote innovation
on the one hand and to address the social, ethical and legal issues associated
with life-altering technologies on the other. The tension between these two
social objectives was put into bold relief in a study we have recently completed that examines the nexus between biotechnology, innovation, the intellectual property (IP) protection regime and the health sector.
The study focused on innovations based on human genetic materials
(DNA, RNA and the proteins they code for) and on patenting (the most
common form IP protection in this field). Before describing the results of our
exploration let me begin with a few comments about the current status of
patenting and licensing of human genetic materials.
PATENTING OF HUMAN GENETIC MATERIALS
Canada's patent act of 1869 was modeled on the US act of 1790. Changes
to the Canadian patent act since its inception have been influenced by the
evolution of the acts in the UK and US and more recently by the European
Patent Convention and by the need to align the act with Canada's international treaty obligations including treaties dealing with trade related aspects
of intellectual property (TRIPs), classification of patents, recognition of micro-organism deposits, norms for protection of new plant varieties, and the
Patent Cooperation Treaty.
Although human genetic materials, as they exist in nature, cannot be patented in either country, legal precedent has established that chemicals isolated from nature through human intervention are patentable. This precedent
has been applied to the specific polynucleotide sequences in human genetic
materials. Patents have been granted for years on the isolated polynucleotide
sequences per se, as well as on processes for identifying
and isolating (puri2
fying) the sequences and on methods of using them.
2
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Not everyone is happy about this state of affairs. Some oppose the patenting of HGM on religious or moral grounds. Other opponents base their arguments on what they regard as the unique characteristics of nucleotide sequences; namely, that they are of a "hybrid nature ... (in that) they are both a
chemical product and pure information". They see the granting of patents on
DNA as "crossing an important barrier: (namely), the (traditional) exclusion
of information as such from patent coverage."3 However all "chemical products" contain information, to the extent that their physical structure is known.
The unique feature of nucleotide sequences therefore is not that they contain
information, but rather that they contain specific information about the genetic predisposition not only of the individual from whom the sequence has
been derived, but also of their predecessors and their progeny - matters that,
in our society, are deemed to be private and are protected as such under law.
As with other kinds of invention, to obtain a patent involving human genetic materials the inventor must show that the invention falls in the class of
patentable subject-matter and is new, useful, and not obvious to someone
skilled in the particular field. In particular the inventor must be able to identify the novel genetic sequence, specify the product of the sequence and how
it functions in nature, and show that it has utility. The utilities of the nucleotide sequences patented to date include their role in gene regulation, in encoding for therapeutic proteins, as diagnostic probes, as receptors used for
identifying molecular targets for therapeutic drug development, as immunogens, and gene replacement therapies.
The non-obviousness (inventiveness) criterion of patentability is intended
to enable distinguishing between innovations that justify the potential economic rewards of patenting and those that do not. Many scientists question
whether, in an era of high throughput automated DNA sequencing, some
patents provide undue potential reward for minor advances that would in any
case have been made by others working in the public domain and impose
cost burdens on researchers working on fundamental problems in molecular
genetics. The U.S. Report, A Patent System for the 2 1st Century4 points out
that, as a result of judicial decisions, a new genetic sequence claimed in the
U.S. is automatically considered non-obvious, whereas the European Patent
Office requires the applicants to "demonstrate either that obtaining the sequence was in fact a technical achievement or that they have discovered a
new or unexpected property associated with the gene." 5
(2005), available at http://www.cipp.mcgill.ca/data/publications/00000015.pdf. (comparing
Canada's patent system with those of other key jurisdictions).
3 E. Richard Gold, Gene Patentsand MedicalAccess, 49 INTELL. PROP. F. 20 (2002).
4 A PATENT SYsTEM FOR THE 21 s CENTURY (S.A. Merrill, R.C. Levin & M. B. Myers eds.,
The National Academies Press 2004).
Id. at 93.
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The extent to which the claims allowed are viewed as meeting the three
criteria of novelty, non-obviousness, and utility is often referred to as "patent
quality.",6 As we shall see later, one facet of patent quality that has proven to
be particularly contentious in the health sector is the scope or breadth of protection identified in the description of the IP and the allowed claims.
The diffusion of patented IP in society is influenced by the ways in which
patent holders seek to exploit their patent rights, including the approach they
take to licensing; namely, whether they license at all, and if so whether they
license exclusively or freely. Diffusion of patented IP can also be affected by
the transaction costs associated with negotiating licenses and/or the level of
fees and royalties involved. Both of these elements can be particularly problematic in attempting to negotiate licensing of gene patents. Among the over
3 million gene patents that have been issued worldwide, there are many areas
in which there are thickets of overlapping patents involving many patent
holders.
THE PROBLEM
We were asked to undertake our study by Canada's federal departments
of health and industry. The terms of reference included the statement: "The
objective of an effective and balanced intellectual property regime is to act as
an important stimulus for innovation, by protecting and nourishing creativity
and investment, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of such innovation, and in a manner conducive to economic and social benefits."
For the purposes of our study we took the term innovation as applied to
health to mean the introduction (implementation, application) of new ideas,
goods, services, processes and practices into the organization, management
and delivery of health services. (In other words to innovate means doing
something new - not just thinking of something new.) From a health policy
perspective, the goal is to foster innovation that improves health or that prevents or mitigates its deterioration. In practical terms this means fostering the
capacity to:
0

6

generate knowledge that may lead to novel goods, services,
processes and practices

See id. at 46-63 (A detailed discussion of patent quality in general); See id at 991-95

(non-obviousness in particular); See also J. Paradise, L. Andrews & T. Holbrook, Patents on
human genes: an analysis of scope and claims, 307 Sci. 1566, 1566-7 (2005) (While the
methodology used in this study has been disputed, e.g. K. Murashige and J.J. Rolla, Response,
Problems in PatentingHuman Genes 308 Sci., 1868, 1868-9 (2005), this peer-reviewed article is one of the few available studies to date on patent quality),
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develop, produce and market new goods, services, processes
and practices
regulate their introduction into the marketplace
adopt their use in the promotion of health and in the prevention, diagnosis and treatment of disease and disability.

The recent surge in patenting of human genetic materials has fueled a
growing debate and controversy about the effects of such patents and patentrelated practices on each of these steps leading to health innovations.7'8 Some
question the propriety of such patents on ethical grounds, while others are
concerned about practices that act as barriers to industrial and economic development, to research, or to ready and affordable access to products and
services.
In its 2002 policy on the patenting of the human genome, the Canadian
College of Medical Geneticists 9 put the concern this way:
We emphasize that the discoveries that result in patents on human
genes are largely the product of massive public investment and decades of collaborative research involving innumerable participants
around the world. We are concerned that human gene patents do not
recognize the essential public investment in this process of collaboration and discovery. We are concerned that such patents can be used to
unfairly restrict the potential benefits of discovery of the genome, and

7 ONTARIO MINISTRY OF HEALTH AND LONG-TERM CARE, GENETICS, TESTING AND GENE

PATENTING: CHARTING NEW TERRITORY IN HEALTH CARE

(MHLTC 2002), available at

www.health.gov.on.ca/english/public/pub/ninistry-reports/geneticsrepO2/reponrt-e.pdf

dorsed by all provincial premiers of Canada);

(en-

AUSTRALIAN LAW REFORM COMMISSION, GENES

AND INGENUITY: GENE PATENTING AND HUMAN HEALTH (ALRC 2004), available at
http://www.austlii.edu.aulau/other/alrc/publications/reports/99/; Nuffield Council on Bioethics, The Ethics of Patenting DNA: a discussion paper (2002) (unpublished manuscript
available at http://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/fileLibrary/pdf/theethicsofpatentingdna.pdf);
Danish Council of Ethics, Patenting Human Genes and Stem Cells: A Report (2004) (unpublished manuscript available at http://www.etiskraad.dk/graphics/03udgivelser/engelske_
publikationer/patenting-human-genespatentsO4index.htm); NATIONAL ETHICS COUNCIL, THE
PATENTING OF BIOTECHNOLOGICAL INVENTIONS INVOLVING THE USE OF BIOLOGICAL MATERIAL
OF HUMAN ORIGIN (NEC 2005); NEW ZEALAND MINISTRY OF HEALTH AND MINISTRY OF
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, MEMORANDUM TO CABINET POLICY COMMITTEE: REPORT BACK
WITH RECOMMENDATIONS AND OPTIONS FOR ADDRESSING GENETIC MATERIAL PATENTS (2004).

8 OECD, Guidelines for the Licensing of Genetic Inventions, http://www.oecd.org/document/26/0,2340,en 2649 37437_34317658_1_1_1_37437,00.html, (last visited May 2, 2005);
Best Practices for the Licensing of Genomic Inventions: Final Notice, 70 Fed. Reg. 18413.
9 Canadian College of Medical Geneticists, Patenting of the Human Genome (2002) (unpublished manuscript available at http://ccmg.medical.orglpdf/ccmg-genome.pdf) (position
statement approved by the CCMG Annual General Meeting, September 21, 2002).
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that unreasonable exploitation of the entitlements of a patent holder
will be detrimental to the health and well being of Canadians.
In short, we defined the problematique constituting the impetus for our
study as follows. When the holder of a patent on an invention involving human genetic materials, sets prices that are excessive, fails to supply the market, or refuses to license the patent on reasonable terms, the ability to gain
access to a beneficial health innovation either for research or clinical use may
be significantly impaired and the achievement of the objective of mutual
advantage of producers and users may be frustrated.
This is by no means a problem that is unique to Canada. Concerns about
patenting of human genetic materials have been explored in other countries
and we benefited considerably from work done by bodies in the US, Australia and Europe. In our analysis of the issues in gene patenting we kept in
mind the fact that although current debates have been mainly prompted by
disputes involving the patenting of diagnostic genetic tests, nearly all of the
matters at issue and, as you will see later, nearly all of the remedies we propose, apply in some degree to other technological applications that involve
patenting. Both the issues and remedies fall into two main categories - those
having to do with the breadth of protection afforded by patents and the licensing behaviour of patent holders.
PATENT BREADTH
Although there is considerable disagreement in the literature about the extent to which patenting acts as a spur to follow-on inventions, there is no
doubt that patenting is regarded as essential for attracting investment in the
development and commercialization of health-related patented inventions
involving lengthy and expensive processes required to meeting regulatory
requirements. From a business perspective, the broader the patent protection
the better, since it increases the likelihood that the patent holder will be able
to bring the invention to market before competition emerges. Thus, on the
one hand, if the patent protection available becomes too narrow, the business
case for pursuing development and commercialization can be undermined
and useful inventions may not become available to the public. On the other
hand if the protection is too broad it can create the opportunity for patent
holders to stifle follow-on inventions by others and limit access to beneficial
innovations.
This begs the question of when a patent may be regarded as too broad.
The emerging de facto consensus is that a patent may be too broad if the utility criterion of patentability is applied so liberally that it allows claims that
are insufficiently specific, substantial and credible. This is illustrated, for
example, in the case of some current patents on DNA sequences that cover
all possible tests that might be devised for determining the presence or ab-
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sence of particular gene mutations. In other words, such a patent confers the
right to prevent all others from copying, using or selling the patented sequence and, since copying of the sequence may be an essential element in
tests to identify mutations, the patent holder can effectively prevent anyone
from giving or taking an alternative test even if it is superior in sensitivity
and specificity to the particular test described in the patent application. With
no competition from other tests, the patent holder can set whatever fees and
conditions it likes, and can dictate by whom, how and where tests will be
performed and how information gathered from performing tests will be handled and stored and by whom it may be accessed.
In molecular genetics research, unduly broad protection acts as an impediment in two ways. First, the specificity of nucleotide sequences may
largely preclude the tactic of "inventing around" the patent. Second, as I
mentioned a moment ago, broad patents on a multiplicity of closely related
sequences can lead to a "thicket" of overlapping patent claims. The time and
effort involved in identifying relevant patents and patent holders, the complexity of negotiating licenses with a plethora of patent holders, and the cost
of royalty payments for those licenses may be impediments both for noncommercial research and for research performed in industry on the generation of follow-on inventions. One may speculate that some of the heightened
concern among researchers about patent breadth may be due to recent court
decisions in the US that appear to have narrowed the grounds upon which an
exemption from claims of patent infringement is allowed for experimental
use of patented inventions - a topic to which I shall return later.
EXERCISE OF PATENT RIGHTS
As I noted earlier, some patent holders abuse their monopoly rights. by
exacting rents that are excessive or insisting on unduly restrictive licensing
terms. For example, in respect of genetic tests, the licensing terms may severely limit the choice of test methods or laboratories, require samples to be
exported outside the jurisdiction of Canadian privacy legislation without substituting equivalent safeguards, fail to account for the public health research
value of health information generated through genetic testing and prevent
individuals from having access to their own genetic information.1 °
Some hard liners are unconcerned about such matters. They argue that the
patent holder's contribution to innovation would not have become available
in the absence of a patent u and if patent holders exercise their monopoly
10

E. Richard Gold & Timothy A. Caulfield, The moral tollbooth: a method that

makes use of the patent system to address ethical concerns in biotechnology 359 THE
LANcET 2268, 2268-2270 (2002) (U.K.).
" Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Why the gene patenting controversy persists, 77 AcAD. MED.

Naimark-nnovationin Biotechnology

rights in ways that potential customers don't like the customers can simply
forego the use of the inventions in question, leaving them no worse off than
they were without the invention. This view may be tolerable in the case of
plasma television sets but is of little comfort when the invention may offer
important health benefits to individuals in desperate need of them. This leads
me to a brief digression on the question of medical necessity and its role in
relation to health services in Canada.
Although the provinces in Canada have the constitutional responsibility
for health services within their jurisdictions, the Canada Health Act establishes conditions that the provinces must meet in order to be eligible to receive federal fiscal transfers. The Act requires public insurance of "medically
necessary" health care services and the courts have in effect interpreted
medical necessity to be whatever physicians identify as a necessity.
The government sector is the largest buyer of many products and services
and when dealing with a single seller is in a situation that some describe as a
bilateral monopoly. However the balance of negotiating power this term implies is tilted heavily in favour of the seller because the government's negotiating power is impaired by the requirement to provide the product irrespective of cost. This perhaps explains why cost issues are a major albeit not the
only concern of Canadian health care providers when anti-competitive practices by patent holders block the development of lower cost alternatives and
impose excessively high prices.
The provinces and territories have made strong representations in favor of
non-discretionary compulsory licensing as a means of preventing what they
regard as detrimental effects of IP protection on costs and other aspects of
health services. They noted that there was precedent for compulsory licensing in that prior to 1987 the Canadian PatentAct permitted any company to
produce patented drugs under a compulsory license on payment of a royalty
of 4 per cent of sales. Others argued strongly against actions that would remove or substantially weaken a crucial incentive to investment in an important sector of the Canadian economy. There were also calls for Canada to
broaden its recognition of the moral and ethical dimensions of innovation and
property rights in all areas of technology by including a public order and
morality provision in the Patent Act, analogous to the "ordre public" provision in European law.
PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE
The federal government is generally wary of introducing changes to the
IP regime unless the need to do so is compelling. We concluded that, despite
a relative paucity of quantitative empirical data, there is sufficient qualitative
1381, 1381-1387 (2002).
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evidence to warrant changes in Canada's IP regime so that it is better able to
achieve its objectives in fostering innovation while, in effect, making it more
responsive to health concerns. Our recommendations fall into two main categories: the process of patenting and the uses of patents. Some of the changes
we propose would align Canada's regime more closely with that in the US;
others involve taking a different tack.
THE PROCESS OF PATENTING
As far as the patenting process is concerned, we recommended: addressing the issue of excessively broad patents through the enhancement clarification, and more rigorous application of patentability criteria. In particular, we
recommended that, as is the case in the US, the utility criterion for patentability include the demonstration that any indicated use be specific, substantial
and credible. We also called for significantly enhanced opportunities to challenge patents: before they are granted by a more open and responsive mechanism than exists now; and, after they are granted, by the introduction of a
statutory opposition procedure.
We are opposed to including, as the Europeans have done, public order
and morality considerations in the process of examining patent applications.
In our view other methods of social control would be more effective in prohibiting the manufacture, sale or use of socially undesirable or illicit products
and services. Moreover, imposing a responsibility to adjudicate moral and
ethical issues on an IP regime that it is not equipped to discharge it would in
our view be a mistake.
Uses of Patented Inventions
With respect to the uses of patents, we focused mainly on licensing and
on provisions related to limitation of patent rights. We called for enhanced
voluntary mechanisms to limit unduly restrictive licensing practices through
development of Canadian licensing guidelines and encouragement of industry initiatives to create patent pools and other mechanisms to remove barriers
to diffusion of HGM-based innovations. In the case of HGM-based inventions developed using public funds obtained through federal grants; we recommended that the federal granting bodies develop licensing guidelines adherence to which would be a condition of funding. We noted that Canada
could benefit from the experience of the NIH and from work currently being
undertaken by the OECD with respect to development of licensing guidelines.
We recommended amendment of the Patent Act to exempt research (experimental use) from claims of infringement where the research involves
using a patented invention for non-commercial purposes. Currently, in both
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Canada and the US, there is reliance mainly on case law to determine which
experimental acts qualify for exemption.1 2 Recent judgments in the US have
been interpreted as establishing that experimental acts are only permitted if
they are not in furtherance of the alleged infringer's legitimate business.1 3 In
our view this is too restrictive and we have therefore proposed the introduction of a statutory exemption that draws on recommendations made recently
in Australia and by a committee of the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences in the US.1 4 It is based on the view that the nature of the experimental acts themselves should determine their eligibility for
exemption and the acts that qualify for exemption should be specified.
Limiting the Exercise of Patent Rights
To deal with concerns about exercise of patent rights, most IP regimes include mechanisms to limit patent rights under certain circumstances. The
TRIPs agreement permits member countries to include a mechanism for issuing compulsory licenses under certain circumstances, providing that the
mechanism does not discriminate among technologies. 15 The Doha Declara12

Exceptions include US Patent Act Section 271(e)(1) which exempts experiments done to

develop and submit information required for FDA approval. Decision in Integra vs Merck
means that drug discovery activities are not exempt if they do not directly generate data for
submission to the FDA.
13 Madey v Duke Univ., 413 F.Supp.2d 601 (M.D.N.C. 2006).
14 The proposed wording recommended is:
(a) an exemption from claims of infringement be provided in the Patent Act for research related to the subject matter of an invention;
(b) research be defined in the wording of the exemption as acts done for experimental
purposes, including acts done to:
i. study the features, properties or inherent characteristics of the invention including how the invention works;
ii. determine the scope of the invention;
iii. determine the validity of the claims;
iv. seek an improvement to the invention or to discover novel methods of making or using the
v. patented invention;
vi. create non-infringing new products or processes, including alternatives and
substitutes; and,
(c) the exemption shall not apply where one seeks to realize economic gain by commercial exploitation of improvements or discoveries resulting from acts done under (b)
iv.
5 TRIPs Art. 31:
Where the law of a member allows for other use of the subject matter of a patent without the authorization of the right holder, including use by the government or third parties authorized by the government, the following provisions shall be respected: ...
(b) such use may only be permitted if, prior to such use, the proposed user has made
efforts to obtain authorization from the right holder on reasonable commercial terms
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tion on the TRIPs Agreement and Public Health "reaffirms the right of WTO
members to use, to the full, the provisions in the TRIPs agreement, which
provide flexibility ...
to protect
public health, and, in particular to promote
' 16
access to medicines for all."
Government Use
Most IP regimes provide mechanisms for governments to issue or compel
the issuance of a license of IP rights for government use. It is an option
available to governments as they aim to maintain an appropriate balance between the rights of patent holders and the public interest.' 7 The Canadian
PatentAct gives governments the right to request from the Commissioner of
Patents a licence to use a patented invention. For a "public non-commercial
use", the application can be made without prior negotiation with the patent
holder. Although It has been suggested that this section could be used in respect of any health care service provided (directly or indirectly) by government it has in fact not been used for this purpose - perhaps
because of uncer18
tainty about what would qualify as "government use".
In the United States, the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 9 includes a provision allowing a federal agency, in certain circumstances, to ensure that a federally
funded invention is available for the public good. It allows the agency to
license a funding recipient's invention to a third party who has tried and
failed to obtain a license from the patent holder on reasonable terms. The
application of Canada's government use provision is not restricted to federally funded inventions.
and conditions and that such efforts have not been successful within a reasonable period of time ...
16 Declaration on the TRIPs Agreement and Public Health, Ministerial Conference, Fourth
Session, Doha [Qatar], 9-14 Nov. 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, para. 4.
We agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent members from taking
measures to protect public health. Accordingly, while reiterating our commitment to the
TRIPS Agreement, we affirm that the Agreement can and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO members' right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all. In this connection, we reaffirm the right of
WTO members to use, to the full, the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement, which provide
flexibility for this purpose.... Accordingly and in the light of paragraph 4 above, while maintaining our commitments in the TRIPS Agreement, we recognize that these flexibilities include: Each member has the right to grant compulsory licences and the freedom to determine
the grounds upon which such licences are granted.
17 M. ADCOCK, ET AL., REPORT ON THE USE OF PATENTS BY GOVERNMENTS:
A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF COMPULSORY
CANADA

(2005).

LICENCES AND

GOVERNMENT USE, FOR HEALTH

18 E. Richard Gold & Danial K. Lam, Balancing Trade in Patents - Public NonCommercial Use and Compulsory Licensing, 6 THE J. OF WORLD INTELL. PROP. 5, 5-32 (2003).
'9 35 USC §202(c)(4) (2005).
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Abuse of Rights Under Patent
In the US, cases of anti-competitive behavior are usually dealt with under
federal trade legislation. In Canada, the Patent Act allows any interested person to apply to the Commissioner of Patents for a license to a patented invention if the patent holder refuses to negotiate a license on reasonable terms or
where a patent is not being practiced. However, this provision has rarely
been used, and never in respect of genetic inventions. There is very little
guidance from the courts, legislature, or other sources of law on what factors
are to be considered in assessing whether demand for a patented article is
being met 'to an adequate extent and on reasonable terms'. Moreover, the
language of the abuse of patent provision leaves considerable uncertainty as
to whether it could be used by public health sector institutions.
Accordingly, we recommended strengthening current provisions of the
Patent Act pertaining to both government use of patented inventions and to
abuse of rights under patent so as to make the provisions more responsive to
concerns related to health: by defining government use to include use in
government-funded, not-for-profit, public enterprises in Canada that provide
services pertaining to health and public safety; by developing criteria for
testing whether the terms and conditions (both commercial and noncommercial) under which patent holders are willing to authorize use of a
patented invention meet the reasonable requirements of the public 20 ; and, by
developing criteria by which a use by a government would qualify as a public, non-commercial use that ought to be exempt from a requirement that the
applicant attempt to negotiate reasonable terms with the patentee.
We called for the elaboration, under the abuse of patent provision, criteria
for determining whether the demand for a patented article is being met to an
adequate extent and on reasonable terms including "reasonable requirements
of the public"; and, adding to the list of those who may be deemed to be
prejudiced by a patent holder's refusal to grant a license on reasonable terms,
government funded not-for-profit public enterprises providing services pertaining to health and safety.
We recommended that the criteria developed for adjudicating the reasonableness of terms and conditions of the licensing of rights under patent include reasonableness of prices of products and services.21'22'23 We also pro20 Which in turn should include, for example, with respect to genetic testing, access for
patients, allowing competitive perfection of the tests, facilitating research ethics board approved clinical research in academic medical centres, facilitating professional education and
training, permitting independent validation of test results, protecting the privacy rights of
individuals and ensuring regulatory compliance.
21 There have been calls from many quarters for the introduction of compulsory licensing
of diagnostic genetic tests. (as used to be the case in Canada with respect to patented medicines). In order to clarify the debate, the term "compulsory licensing provision" needs some
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posed the establishment of a Patented Inventions Licensing Review Board to
advise and assist the Commissioner of Patents in the exercise of the Commissioners discretionary powers under the government use and abuse of patent
provisions.
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
Before concluding my remarks I should make three corollary observations. First, although patenting is the most common form of IP protection
used for genetic inventions, copyright is also used - primarily to protect the
IP inherent in genetic databases. Second, most of the debate about gene patents is focused on genetic testing - but patented HGM are increasingly important in therapeutics (drugs, gene therapy, cell/tissue/organ transplantation)
and one should keep in mind that market dynamics, regulatory controls and
impacts may vary according to the type of innovation involved. Third, the

elaboration. For present purposes, it is useful to distinguish between two types of compulsory
licensing depending on who is compelled to do what. There can be statutory provisions requiring a patent authority to issue licenses on a priorigrounds in respect of a certain class
of invention (as used to be the case in Canada with respect to patented medicines). The second
type of compulsory licence provides the patent authority with discretionary power to order
a patentee to grant a licence to an applicant under certain conditions (e.g. those contained in
Section 65 of the PatentAct).
22 Before it was removed from the Patent Act, Section 41 .(4) stated: "Where, in
the case of
any patentfor an invention intended or capable of being usedfor medicine orfor the preparation and production of medicine, an applicationis made by any person... the Commissioner
shall grant to the applicanta licence to do the things specified in the application,except such,
if any, of those things in respect of which he sees good reason not to grant such a licence;... "
23 "Since 1923 Canada had a law providing for compulsory licensing of the right to
manufacture within Canada drugs (and also food products) protected by patents (usually process
patents, since product patents were not available at the time)... the Canadian Parliament
amended the law in 1969 to permit compulsory licenses for importation. ... Despite opposition
from consumer advocates and Canadian generic drug providers, the Canadian compulsory
licensing law was weakened in 1987, with the imposition of a seven to ten year exclusivity
period for drug patent holders, and eliminated altogether in 1992. The principal impetus was
lobbying by U.S. and European pharmaceutical manufacturers anticipating the debate over the
proposed free trade treaties between Canada, the United States, and (later) Mexico. As a quid
pro quo, the multinational drug manufacturers agreed to locate in Canada drug research and
development activities roughly proportional to Canada's share of their world sales and to accept a new regime of "reasonable price" controls by the Canadian Patented Medicines Prices
Review Board." F. M. Scherer, The Economics of Compulsory Drug Patent Licensing (2003),
http://wblnOOl8.worldbank.org/HDNet/hddocs.nsf/9b2b70eeb6c333fb852568aa0073e2al/2ad
c484a5d57888f85256d350054080f/$F1LE/F.M.%2OScherer%20-%20paper.doc
(extracted
from F. M. Scherer and Jayashree Watal, Post-TRIPS Options for Access to PatentedMedicines in Developing Countries, 5 J. OF INT'L ECON. L. 913, 913-939 (2002), and written for
Working Group 4 of the Commission for Macroeconomics and Health of the World Trade
Organization, 2001).
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introduction of hybrid products based on convergence of technologies
(nanotechnology and biotechnology) may raise new issues.
Our study involving a major field of innovation (gene technology), an important sector of society (health) and a key modality of social control (IP
regime) illustrates that the processes involved in innovation do not incur in a
vacuum. They are imbedded in a constellation of social, ethical, economic
and legal frameworks that vary from country to country and determine how
the balance between the benefits of innovation and its social cost is struck.
Although discussions about innovation tend to focus heavily if not exclusively on technological innovation, it is important to keep in mind that social
innovation is also critical in improving health status - not only in its own
right but also in its interaction with technological innovations. The particular
challenges associated with biotechnological health innovations are part of the
much larger overarching challenge of how to create the capacity to adopt
beneficial innovations in already heavily burdened health care systems.
Meeting this challenge fully will require more than refinements of an IP regime. It is also likely to require new institutional mechanisms and perhaps
new organizations - but that is a topic for another occasion.
Countries facing these challenges have much to learn from each other and
much to gain through active bilateral and multilateral endeavours. I am grateful to the organizers of this conference for the opportunity to participate in
the bilateral enterprise this conference represents.
DISCUSSION FOLLOWING THE REMARKS OF DR. ARNOLD
NAIMARK
MR. NARD: Given that Dr. Naimark is a panel of one, maybe I could exercise the moderator's prerogative to say a few things before we open it up.
Someone like myself who focuses much of his professional time on patent
law, there is a wonderful comparative advantage between us. You bring the
medicine and the science and a healthy dose of the legal stuff, I must say,
where my relative ignorance of molecular biology will probably manifest
itself in the next 25 minutes.
But I can bring some of the patent law to it. Let me say this: I think it is
important to distinguish between pharmaceuticals and biotechnology. And I
think in the patent debate that when it comes to the end product in the pharmaceutical industry, most all policy makers would agree that patent law has a
very strong role to play.
In biotechnology, where you are not dealing with small molecule chemistry, you have so many research tools and upstream research that we really
don't know what's going to happen with them, but we know they have some
use.

